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Introduction
Deduction from legal rules is undoubtedly one of the most familiar methods of legal 
reasoning. It is – especially in civil law countries – commonplace that statutory rules are 
to be applied deductively, by use of legal syllogism. Legal deduction is supposed to lead 
to objectively correct outcomes, as long as its premises are valid/true. At first sight, the 
deductive line of inference in law seems to be extremely easy in application. One may 
be under the impression that everyone, not only judges and lawyers, can – without any 
special training and preparation – reason in this manner. 
In this paper, I will try first to reveal some weak points of this attitude to legal deduc-
tion and, secondly, to put forward an alternative to the deductive mode of legal reason-
ing, namely legal analogy. 
The mechanism of deduction
In logic, deduction – in contrast to analogy and non-complete induction (i.e. one which 
is not based upon a full set of data) – is a method that guarantees the truthfulness of the 
conclusion, provided the premises are also true. The very scheme of inference leads to 
the infallibility of the outcomes that are hereby reached. This scheme can be presented 
as follows: all A is B (the major premise), C is A (the minor premise) and C is B (the 
conclusion); i.e. like in Aristotle’s example: All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, there-
fore Socrates is mortal too. 
In the legal domain, deduction takes a slightly different form. The major premise is 
constituted by a legal norm (or rule). The case at hand (also called pending, instant, sub 
1 This article is connected to the research project the author carried out in the United Kingdom 
as a guest researcher at Aberystwyth University as part of the Polish governmental programme: 
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judice or under argument) forms the minor premise. The conclusion, in turn, becomes 
the legal consequences for this case. Accordingly, if a norm that forms major premises is 
valid (binding, in effect), and the case at hand is true (its facts are proven or posited as 
such), the legal outcome the deductive leads to is correct as well. In this sense, the de-
ductive mode of legal reasoning can be deemed to be of an infallible or unchallengeable 
nature, and the whole construction, as such, is called a legal syllogism, as opposed to an 
‘ordinary’ (‘logical’) syllogism.2
However, the above thesis as to the infallible nature of legal deduction is, while un-
doubtedly enchanting, nothing more than a  utopian idea – a  quintessential example 
of legalistic illusion. Indeed, deduction can be infallible, but only in virtual and closed 
systems, like those of numbers, signs or symbols, or other entities that are defined in 
advance and possess fixed and unequivocal meaning (e.g. in the world of mathematics, 
formal logic, IT sciences). It is, however, utterly impotent when it leaves the theoretical 
realm and has to deal with reality, with all its diversity, flux and immeasurability. Hence 
deduction is in a miserable position when it comes to linking the normative sphere (the 
realm of oughtness) to the ontological sphere (the realm of being). The transition from 
one of these spheres to the other is by no means automatic, being in essence a very com-
plex and intricate process.
2 With regard to deduction in legal applications cf. A. Peczenik, On Law and Reason, Dor-
drecht 2009, pp. 14–15; S.J. Burton, An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning, 3rd edition, 
Austin 2007, pp. 43–58; D.N. MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal 
Reasoning, Oxford 2005, pp. 32–48, pp. 49–77; idem, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, Oxford 
1978, pp. 19–72; R.J. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers: A Guide to Clear Legal Thinking, 3rd edition, 
Notre Dame 1997, pp. 53-88; M.P. Golding, Legal Reasoning, Peterborough 2001, pp. 39–42; 
B. Brożek, Rationality and Discourse: Towards a Normative Model of Applying Law, Warszawa 
2007, pp. 39–59; J. Wróblewski, The Judicial Application of Law, Dordrecht 1992, pp. 30–35, 
229–232; S. Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal 
Argument by Analogy, “Harvard Law Review” 1995–1996, no. 109, pp. 930–931 and footnote 13; 
R. Cross, Precedent in English Law, Oxford 1968, pp. 176–181; R. Cross, J.W. Harris, Precedent 
in English Law, 4th edition, Oxford 1991, pp. 187–192; S. Hanson, Legal Method & Reasoning, 2nd 
ed., London 2003, pp. 215–217; K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, Zagadnienia teorii prawa, Warszawa 
1969, pp.  308–315. On the notion of a  legal norm (rule) cf. A. Ross, Directives and Norms, 
London 1968, pp. 78–138; F. Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-
Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life, Oxford 1991, pp. 1–37; G.C. Christie, Law, Norms 
& Authority, London 1982, pp. 2–27. On deduction (syllogism) in general cf. J.S. Mill, A System 
of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and 
the Methods of Scientific Investigation, 8th edition, New York 1882, pp. 126–157; Th. Fowler, The 
Elements of Deductive Logic, 10th edition, Oxford 1895, pp. 85–109. For human rule-based rea-
soning in psychology cf. S.A. Sloman, Two Systems of Reasoning, [in] Heuristics and Biases. The 
Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, eds. Th. Gilovich, D.W. Griffin, D. Kahneman, Cambridge 
2002, pp. 381–383; L.J. Rips, The Psychology of Proof: Deductive Reasoning in Human Thinking, 
Cambridge 1994.
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Legal deduction misconception
Apart from the requirement that the rule that serves as a major premise has to be infal-
lible in the sense that whenever the antecedent occurs the legal consequence prescribed 
by this rule cannot be non-entailed, the precondition of the success of legal deduction is 
that the symbols, objects, persons which are mentioned in the major premise have to be 
exactly the same as the symbols, objects and persons present in the minor premises. In 
the example with Socrates, we have, therefore, to be certain that Socrates is one of the 
men which the major premise refers to. If there is even a grain of doubt in this respect, 
the whole infallibility of the deduction is rendered invalid. In mathematics and formal 
logic, objects are determined and precise. We know that 2, 3, 4, 5... are numbers, we know 
that 2 plus 2 is 4, and that it could not be otherwise. Similarly in board games, like chess, 
we have no doubt which piece is which or how it can move. 
In legal deduction, however, we encounter a serious problem at the very outset. Firstly, 
both the major and minor premises are not given beforehand. And they need to be con-
structed in a way which is far from objective or even intersubjective. In order to obtain 
the major premise, a legal norm or rule, one has to derive it from a judicial precedent 
or canonical text (i.e. a text of statutes, regulations, constitutions, ordinances etc). The 
process of such derivation is, however, not standardized and free of subjective choices; 
different norms (rules), of an uneven degree of generality and complexity, can be con-
structed upon the same provision of a given legal act. 
Even more serious difficulties occur when we turn to the minor premise of legal de-
duction. This premise is not given in any form; it have to be constructed almost com-
pletely from scratch. 
What we are dealing with are actually the raw facts of the case at hand. To obtain 
the minor premise, we must process thus these facts and put them into a linguistic de-
scription so as to form a specific expression which may be subsequently used as a minor 
premise for the sake of legal deduction. Yet since we may describe any factual situation 
in an infinite number of ways, we do not describe those facts neutrally, but rather in the 
terms of the major premise (a norm/rule constituting this premise), or, looking from 
a slightly different angle, we ascertain here whether the situation generally stated in the 
major premise (the norm/rule it is consisted of ) also occurs in the case at hand.
It is noteworthy that the effect of such ascertainment/description leads directly to the 
application or non-application of a rule (norm) that forms the major premise to the case 
at hand, entailing as a corollary that we ascribe to this case the legal consequence which 
this rule (norm) prescribes. Hence, one may say that, after having made the aforemen-
tioned description/ascertainment, there is no reasoning at all in legal deduction. The 
subsumption of the rule forming the major premise to the described factual situation 
that constitutes the minor premise is a mere illustration which has no bearing on the 
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outcome of legal deduction. Everything which was crucial and decisive for this outcome 
had already been done, i.e. while the minor premises had been being constructed, the 
phenomenon present in the case at hand had been being classified as one encompassed 
by the rule specified in the major premises.3 
Before, however, making such a classification, the major premise of a legal deduction 
is, as Burton metaphorically put it, ‘dangling in the air.’4 There is a gap between the facts 
of the case and the rule (norm) that, as Weinreb says, has to be bridged.5 In turn, after 
a classification has been made, no further mental operation is needed. So Cross may con-
fidently elucidate that “the crucial decision is made before the reasoning can be cast into 
syllogistic form. Not only is the syllogism constructed after the facts have been found, 
but it is also constructed after any legal problems concerning the scope of the rule have 
been solved.”6 
The internal normative element
The above charge is, however, only a part of the bigger picture. Legal deduction is in fact 
far more complicated than logicians may suppose. The building of the major premise, as 
well as that of the minor premise (the classification involved in the latter), does not hap-
pen in vain. The reasoner constructs both premises with a special aim that is well known 
for this reasoner in advance. This special aim, the known purpose, is not to ascertain what 
could be linguistically or logically extracted from the canonical text. Nor is it to state 
how the persons, objects or items present in the case at hand can be best described from 
the point of language – be it ordinary or sophisticated (especially technical) or official. 
That purpose/aim is to determine what is to be prescribed, ordered, allowed or prohib-
ited by the law in the case at hand: what are to be the duties and obligations of the liti-
gants, which of them is to win and which is to lose the case. This awareness accompanies 
the reasoner throughout the process from which both premises emerge.7
I venture to say that this – let us call it ‘normative’ – element is intrinsic to legal deduc-
tion and cannot be separated and put aside, despite all the efforts made to that end. Dur-
3 Cf. S.J. Burton, op. cit., p. 43; yet cf. S. Brewer, op. cit., pp. 980–983, 994–998, 1000–1003.
4 S.J. Burton, op. cit., p. 57. 
5 L.L. Weinreb, Legal Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument, Cambridge 2005, p. 90.
6 R. Cross, op. cit., p. 178 (R. Cross, J.W. Harris, op. cit., p. 189); R. Cross, op. cit., pp. 178–179 
(R. Cross, J.W. Harris, op. cit., pp. 189–190).
7 The goal-oriented nature of legal deduction (classification involved therein) seems to be also 
discerned by M.P. Golding. He asserts that the question of classification which judges deal 
with is not of the form: “Is X a Y?” but rather of the form: “Is X a Y for certain legal purposes?” 
or – which he prefers even more – of the form: “Should X be treated as a Y for certain legal 
purposes?”. Cf. M.P. Golding, op. cit., p. 106. 
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ing the whole process of the building of major and minor premises, one is fully aware 
what it is all about and what the consequences of one’s choices involved therein will be. 
In effect, consciously or subconsciously, this indissoluble awareness influences – at least 
to some extent – the emergence of each of the premises. 
Furthermore, legal culture, especially in civil law countries, becomes an unexpect-
ed ally here, offering a wide array of means by which one may interpret the canonical 
text while deriving a  rule (norm) before it will form a major premise. The choice of 
the deductive reasoner is rich: ranging from different literal, teleological and systemic 
principles of interpretation without any definite order of priority between them; not to 
mention such legal concepts as that of the ‘rational legislator’ or different interpretative 
presumptions (e.g. of ordinary language or conformity with EU law). To have a major 
premise in a desirable shape, it thus suffices to pick – from among the available options 
– the one which best conforms to one’s ‘normative’ preference. 
In turn, while creating the minor premise (making classification), in addition to the 
features of language such as vagueness, ambiguity,8 indeterminacy9 and context depend-
ence that provide considerable leeway for personal evaluation, one may also take advan-
tage of the latitude that stems from the rules of evidence, including the assessment of 
8 On ambiguity and vagueness of terms present in language cf. for instance, F. Schauer, Thinking 
Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning, Cambridge 2009, pp. 18–23; F. Schauer, 
Playing..., op. cit., pp. 31-37, S.J. Burton, op. cit., p. 52; S. Brewer, op. cit., pp. 993–994; B. Brożek, 
op. cit., pp. 25–28.
9 The indeterminacy of terms present in language is their intrinsic feature, to remedy which 
dictionary definitions are of no aid. These definitions are by their very nature imperfect. Not 
only do they often amount to proffering chains of words which at some point overlap, but such 
chains can also severely distort the real meaning. To check this, one may look up the meaning 
of some ordinary word with which meaning one is well acquainted; next turn to the definitions 
of the words that are used to define this word, and then proceed to the entries that elucidate 
the words used in the latter definitions. It is quite probable that what will have thus been re-
ceived will be the same words that are present in the definition of the first word or something 
which – transposing into this definition – is in variance with the ‘intuitive’ meaning of that first 
word. The dictionary definitions, terms and phrases included therein, give only an approximate 
meaning of the words being defined, and when you go deeper and deeper, the original mean-
ing is so deformed that the defective nature of the lexical definitions is clearly visible. Defining 
one word by resorting to another which is – at this or some further step – defined by the first 
word in a row is also unreliable. We know the meaning of particular words mainly from the 
use of these words in a number of contexts, not from their dictionary definitions. This problem 
of the indeterminacy innate in language also applies to legal definitions, i.e. definitions which 
are included in statutes in order to explain the words and phrases used therein. Cf. S.J. Burton, 
op. cit., pp 54-55. As to the observation that it is impossible to find two words in a language that 
have an ‘exactly’ identical meaning (are real synonyms) and the problems one encounters while 
building lexical definitions cf. Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki, Wieloznaczność leksykalna w interpre-
tacji prawniczej, Kraków 1978, pp. 31–32 and 34–37 respectively. 
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the credibility of witness testimony or the presence of more than one probable course 
of events.10 
As already stated, this normative element of legal deduction presents itself as indis-
pensible and inescapable. If one tries to separate and abandon it, for instance, in favour 
of the purely linguistic meaning of a canonical text, the legal outcomes would become 
haphazard and often patently absurd, or unjust to an extent that no-one of sound mind 
could accept them. 
To sum up, the passage from the specific to the general, from the ‘is’ to the ‘ought,’ is 
not only not automatic, but it is to a large extent dependent on the particular person who 
makes it. The ways this person can follow are individual choices, rather than choices de-
termined purely by logic/mathematics. The deductive scheme of inference serves here, in 
turn, only as a schematic illustration of what has previously been done. It neither shows 
the real sequence of reasoning, nor justifies the outcome reached. 
One more reason for the logical fallacy of legal deduction
Legal deduction also encounters one additional obstacle from the requirements of logic. 
As Cross and Harris noted, in syllogism the test of the validity of the conclusion consists 
in the principle that the denial of the conclusion entails the denial of one or other of the 
premises.11 If we treat this requirement strictly, such a test would mean that in legal syl-
logism the denial of the conclusion must entail the denial of the truthfulness of the facts 
of the case at hand, or the denial of the validity of the legal rule (norm) that constitutes 
the major premise. If, therefore, there were a rule at the entrance to a bus banning dogs, 
and if a bus driver nonetheless permitted a guide dog to enter, the whole rule would thus 
be automatically made invalid (legally void). Such an attitude does not, however, fit the 
common understanding of how legal rules operate, i.e. lawyers as well as the addressees 
of law know that despite allowing a guide dog to go on a bus, the rule banning entry 
to dogs can still be in force in relation to the vast array of dogs that are not guide dogs. 
Corollaries: the alternative seen in legal analogy
If legal deduction is either a fallacy from the logical point of view, or a mere illustration 
of another kind of mental operation that occurred previously, what is, therefore, the real 
10 Incidentally, in legal deduction, the derivation of a rule (norm) that forms the major premise and 
the determining of the facts that constitute the minor premise seem to be done simultaneously. 
On the lack of difference from the standpoint of pure logic between the interpretation of the 
wording of a  legal rule (ascertaining of this rule meaning) and the classification of a given 
phenomenon under such a rule cf. D.N. MacCormick, Legal..., op. cit., pp. 93–97. 
11 R. Cross, op. cit., pp. 177–178; R. Cross, J.W. Harris, op. cit., pp. 188–189.
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mode of legal reasoning by which the law is applied in concrete cases? Having to answer 
such a question, it may be wise to rest on the assertion that this mode depends on the in-
ternal human ability to take into account a number of divergent factors that are regarded 
by the reasoner as relevant in law, viz.: the intention of the legislator, historical events 
that preceded the given legislation and the mischief which this legislation springs from, 
the past judicial decisions rendered in similar cases, values and goals that are generally 
protected and pursued in a given legal system, common sense and the sense of justice, 
socially accepted attitudes, and the socially desired outcome for the case at hand, etc.12 
If one perceives legal deduction as an all-embracing collective name for considering 
such diverse factors, not as something grounded in logic, that stance may be consid-
ered reasonable.13 However, one other legal method presents itself as more adequate and 
promising here, namely: legal analogy. All the more so if we comprehend such analogy 
as being complex, multidimensional, dependent on a broad socio-political context, and 
hard-wired into the human mode of non-standardized thinking.
Thus understood, analogy works through the judgement of the similarity between the 
cases being compared, where judgment is a result of the resemblance between the all or 
selected facts of these cases, influenced by the factors mentioned in the paragraph above. 
The first outcomes reached by such an analogy – which are delivered almost automati-
cally by intuition or hunch – can then be tested by reference to these factors, among 
which special prominence should be given to the rationale of the ‘legal cases’ that have 
been used as the points for comparison with the case at hand. These ‘legal cases’ may be 
here of a different origin: precedential ones, typical instances that a particular statutory 
provision applies to, cases – hypothetical or real – the legal consequences of which are 
known and difficult to challenge for a member of a given legal culture. In this way, legal 
analogy may lead to the application in concrete cases of already existing judicial prec-
12 Also the attributes of the reasoner themselves cannot be ignored here. They influence the result 
of the application of law to a similar – if not even a greater – extent. In consequence, the beliefs, 
preferences of values and desired goals together with all of the data and information stored 
in the long-term and short-term memory of a  judge would have some impact on the legal 
outcome he/she arrives at in a pending case.
13 The necessity of taking into account different factors of the aforementioned kind is probably also 
a reason why legal rules are said to be never completely indicative in relation to the situation in 
which they apply. On such assertions cf. G.C. Christie, op. cit., pp. 7–8. From the psychological 
point of view, taking into account such a mixture of incommensurable factors is possible within 
the so-called intuitive (experiential, associative) reasoning that is here opposed to the rational, 
deliberative, rule-based kind. On this psychological division cf. S. Epstein, Integration of the 
Cognitive and the Psychodynamic Unconscious, “American Psychologist” 1994, vol. 49, pp. 709–
724; M. Gladwell, Blink. The Power of Thinking without Thinking, London 2006; Handbook of 
Intuition Research, ed. M. Sinclair, Cheltenham 2011; Heuristics and Biases..., op. cit.; Intuition in 
Judgment and Decision Making, ed. H. Plessner, C. Betsch, T. Betsch, New York 2008.
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edents, and of statutory, precedential, constitutional or even customary rules, as well as 
the law in general.
An analogical mode of applying the law thus comprehended may also be a remedy 
for curtailing judicial discretion and making legal decisions seem less arbitrary. At least, 
as it appears, the giving of priority to the above-mentioned factors is more trustworthy 
and ordered when it is done in relation to the concrete facts of the cases being compared 
than it would be if it were made in abstracto. If a rationale can explain a specific legal 
consequence ascribed to one case, why should it not be used in order to ascribe the same 
or a similar legal consequence to another case if such ascribing is identically or similarly 
justified in light of this rationale? 
The application of general rules via analogy in the place of legal deduction has also 
attracted the attention of a number of scholars, gaining their acceptance and often open 
admiration. Thus Weinreb states: “[w]ithout the intervention of analogical arguments, 
legal rules and the rule of law itself would be only theoretical constructs.”14 Arthur Kauf-
mann is recognized as the proponent of the idea that “by its nature every application of 
law, every Rechtsfindung, consists not in a conclusion of formal-logical type identifiable 
as simple subsumption, but in a process of analogical type,”15 which concept was later on 
endorsed by Jacques Lenoble.16 According to Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, in turn, if 
a case does not belong to plain cases (i.e. those “constantly recurring in similar contexts 
to which general expressions are clearly applicable” / “where there is general agreement 
in judgments as to the applicability of the classifying terms”), all that one called upon 
to answer can do is to consider “whether the present case resembles the plain case ‘suf-
ficiently’ in ‘relevant’ respects.”17 In a similar vein, Bańkowski and MacCormick assert 
that: “Where the problem is whether or not to qualify a problematic phenomenon as 
instantiating some statutory term or another, analogy to less problematic instances cov-
ered by prior decisions is relevant.”18 And Burton explains that: “...analogical reasoning 
may be used to help interpret and apply an enacted rule. The analysis begins with the 
enacted text. It may help to find base points in the context that can be used to reason 
analogically in a problem case.”19 
14 L.L. Weinreb, op. cit., p. 13. 
15 Cf. G. Zaccaria, Analogy as Legal Reasoning – The Hermeneutic Foundation of the Analogical Pro- 
cedure, [in] Legal Knowledge and Analogy. Fragments of Legal Epistemology, Hermeneutics and 
Linguistics, ed. P. Nerhot, Dordrecht 1991, pp. 42, 45–49.
16 J. Lenoble, The Function of Analogy in Law: Return to Kant and Wittgenstein, [in] Legal Know- 
ledge..., op. cit., p. 118.
17 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed., Oxford 1994, pp. 126–127.
18 Z. Bańkowski, D.N. MacCormick, Statutory Interpretation in the United Kingdom, [in] Inter- 
preting Statutes. A Comparative Study, eds. D.N. MacCormick, R.S. Summers, Aldershot 1991, 
p. 369.
19 S.J. Burton, op. cit., p. 77.
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Levi also points out that: 
It is only folklore which holds that a statute if clearly written can be completely 
unambiguous and applied as intended to a specific case. Fortunately or otherwise, 
ambiguity is inevitable in both statute and constitution as well as with case law. 
Hence reasoning by example operates with all three.20 
Murray and DeSanctis advise that: 
Often the legal rules used in the rule-based reasoning syllogism require explanation 
and illumination to demonstrate for the reader why your prediction of the outcome 
is legally sound and likely to occur. Analogical reasoning is used within the rule-
based reasoning syllogism to further the overall discussion by showing how the rule 
itself or elements of the rule are supposed to work by discussing and analogizing to 
or from certain actual circumstances (cases) where the rule was applied to produce 
a certain outcome.21 
And Eileen Braman contends that: 
In statutory construction, for instance, when the “plain language” of a disputed pro-
vision is ambiguous, judges often look to previous application of the law, seeking to 
draw connections and/or distinctions between past and pending scenarios. Using 
analogy in this way helps judges make reasoned decisions about whether or not 
a particular rule should apply to circumstances giving rise to litigation.22
20 E.H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, Chicago 1949, p. 6.
21 M.D. Murray, Ch.H. DeSanctis, Legal Research and Writing, New York 2005, p. 10.
22 E. Braman, Law Politics & Perception. How Policy References Influence Legal Reasoning, Char- 
lottesville 2009, p. 84; C.R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, New York 1996, 
pp. 79–90; C.R. Sunstein, Commentary on Analogical Reasoning, “Harvard Law Review” 
1992–1993, no. 106, footnote 147, S. Brewer, op. cit., pp. 990–1003; L.L. Weinreb, op. cit., 
pp. 88–94, E.H. Levi, op. cit., pp. 6–8, 28–32; D.N. MacCormick, Rhetoric..., op. cit., pp. 212–
213; J.  Nowacki, Analogia legis, Warszawa 1966, pp. 49–51, 62–67; H.L.A. Hart, op. cit., 
p. 127; M.P. Golding, op.  cit., pp. 104–107; S.J. Burton, op. cit., pp. 65–74. Moreover, Brewer 
discerns an analogical form of reasoning even in effecting the so-called: ‘reflective equilibrium’ 
between general norms and the particular applications of these norms (cf. S. Brewer, op. cit., 
pp. 9270928, 938–939). Also Sunstein, who has tried to grasp the commonalities between 
reflective equilibrium and analogy, despite describing analogy as less ambitious, for it does not 
require anything like horizontal and vertical consistency, eventually concludes that: “analogical 
reasoning might therefore be understood as a sharply truncated form of the search for reflective 
equilibrium...” (cf. C.R. Sunstein, op. cit., pp. 752–754, 777–778, 781–783). Such an approach is all 
the more noteworthy since “reflective equilibrium” is commonly not considered as something 
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Furthermore, legal analogy is also supposed to be able do that which legal deduction 
cannot, that is, to enable us to pass from the world of ‘is’ to the world of ‘ought.’ Thus 
Broekman turns our attention first to the fact that the presumption fundamental for le-
gal thought is that which assumes the basic analogy between ‘non-legal reality’ and ‘legal 
reality,’ and next argues that analogical reasoning is the preferred way by which one may 
connect these two spheres.23 The passage of this kind is – whether it is within legal de-
duction or analogy – all the more necessary since the factors I referred to in the opening 
paragraph of this section are frequently of a very general character. The reasoner in law, 
in the main, deals with general intention, general history, general plain meaning, general 
moral principles, and so on. And these generalities ought to be somehow processed in 
order to yield a result (legal consequence) for the case at hand.24
Obviously the outcomes of legal analogy – as outcomes of legal deduction – are not 
logical, objective or true. Legal analogy does not, however, purport to be able to do that 
which legal deduction allegedly can do. It is by definition far less ambitious and modest. 
Instead, it seems to be better suited to making the law and its application more bearable 
and less haphazard than it would be without using it. At the same time, legal analogy 
provides the law and its application with the flexibility and reasonableness that they need 
anyway.25 In addition, legal analogy appears to correlate with the reality far better than 
legal deduction does, due to the credo which runs: similar cases should be treated alike. The 
leading thought of legal deduction seems to be, in turn, that: “identical cases ought to 
be treated identically.”26 As we know, in real life identical cases rarely – if ever – occur.27 
Incidentally, it is even believed that the names present in language (common terms, 
attributive and abstract terms, singular and collective terms) owe their existence to com-
parison, being made in order to capture some resemblance or difference between objects 
that involves an analogical pattern of inference (cf. for instance: L. Alexander, E. Sherwin, 
Demystifying Legal Reasoning, Cambridge 2008, pp. 32–39, 64–88). 
23 J.M. Broekman, Analogy in the Law, [in] Legal Knowledge..., op. cit.,  pp. 217–218, 220, 243. 
Weinreb envisages connecting these two spheres in a  fairly interesting way. Namely, the 
application of law – according to him – appears to consist of the adjustment of the facts of an 
instant case and a general legal rule in order to close each together with the aim of obtaining 
the rule that “squarely” or “uniquely” applies to the facts of this case. Even, however, after the 
construction of such a well-fitted rule, there is still a gap between this rule and the facts of the 
pending case that no further statement of the rule-like manner or the specification of the facts 
can close completely. Cf. L.L. Weinreb, op. cit., pp. 82–83, 86–94.
24 S. Burton, op. cit., pp. 55–57.
25 M.P. Golding, op. cit., pp. 48, 107–111.
26 For this aphorism as a counterpart of the maxim: like cases ought to be treated alike in the context 
of the deductive pattern of legal reasoning cf. B.S. Jackson, Analogy in Legal Science: Some 
Comparative Observations, [in] Legal Knowledge..., op. cit., pp. 149–150.
27 The other issue is, however, that the very pattern these cases involve is often repeated; as for 
the problem of universalizability in law cf. for instance: D.N. MacCormick, Rhetoric..., op. cit., 
pp. 146–152. 
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or groups of objects.28 Yet another thing are the attempts made in order to demonstrate 
that both of the types of reasoning mentioned in this paper, deduction and analogy, are 
dependent on the same kind of comparative reasoning.29 
Conclusions
To sum up, legal deduction turns out to be a fallacious mode of legal reasoning, insofar as 
it is supposed to be thoroughly logical and mechanical. Deduction is a method of great 
significance and service in mathematics, IT and other virtual words. However, it is un-
suitable for the legal domain because of the links of the latter with real life and this life’s 
flux and variety. As a method of applying the law, it may only serve as a boilerplate one 
may use to disguise the real kind of reasoning which is dependent upon many divergent 
factors. A more accurate way of capturing how lawyers think seems to be legal analogy. 
It consists in comparing instances for which we know the legal outcomes with instances 
whose legal consequences we are trying to ascertain. An analogical form of reasoning – 
due to the judgement of similarity which may be based on different variables – seems to 
be more suitable for an incommensurable and complex legal environment. Recently, its 
use as a universal legal method has also received considerable attention on the part of 
legal theorists and philosophers, especially those looking on from the vantage point of 
the common law legal system. 
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summary
Legal analogy as an alternative to the deductive model of legal reasoning
This article demonstrates the inadequacy of legal deduction as a method that guarantees 
the certainty and predictability of law and its outcomes in concrete instances. Inter alia, 
the Author brings our attention to the far smaller role that the deductive pattern of in-
ference plays in legal thought than one may suppose, since it is rather only a schematic 
illustration of the decisions that were previously made by recourse to the mental opera-
tions of a non-logical nature. In return, he proffers legal analogy as an alternative, by 
which he understands a mode of thinking which helps the reasoner to take into account 
a mass of different factors that are traditionally deemed to be relevant for legal thought 
and decision-making.
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scheme, thinking, reason by, inference
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